Terrorist group widening inroads among Caucasus extremists.
Since the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan in 2021, Islamic State Khurasan Province (ISKP) has emerged as the most globally ambitious and active branch in both its operations and propaganda of all radical Islamic groups.
ISKP is presently implementing a regionalization and internationalization strategy that has increasingly focused on extending its reach into Central Asia, as well as appealing to associated diaspora elements elsewhere, especially in Russia. The movement’s Central Asian contingent has accounted for a notable share of ISKP-linked activity outside of Afghanistan, but a rising number of instances of terrorist activity are more recently involving Russian nationals, Chechens, and others from its Caucasus region. Jihadism expert Aaron Zelin’s dataset found ISKP to be linked to 12 plots in 2023 and 19 thus far into 2024 – targeting Tajikistan, Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, the United States, India, Iran, and Turkey.
The branch’s Al-Azaim Foundation for Media Production established Tajik and Uzbek media wings in 2022 with great success in building support. More recently ISKP launched a Russian language branch that is increasingly extending its reach online using platforms such as Telegram, Rocket Chat, Threema, Element and others.
ISKP is now integrating its Russian propaganda section with its Tajik and Uzbek components, predominantly on Telegram, demonstrating increased coordination and heightened prioritization of the production unit.
In 2022, ISKP became more vocal in its online criticisms of the Taliban’s relations with Moscow for “befriending Russians, the murderers of Chechen Muslims.” It has also become increasingly overt about its intent to target Russia, urging supporters to “cast fear into the hearts of the sons of Putin and Russia, kill them with cars and knives.” With such calls to action, Al-Azaim was preparing the information space for a suicide bombing against the Russian embassy in Kabul the following month, resulting in the deaths of two staffers.
ISKP often assails Russia’s historical legacy of repressive action against Muslims, as well as its current security and diplomatic engagements in predominantly Muslim countries. In February 2023, for instance, Al-Azaim reminded its supporters about the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the bloody wars in Chechnya, and its ongoing military intervention in Syria. Other stated grievances in its propaganda include Moscow’s contemporary influence in Central Asia, its engagement with private military companies and an armed footprint across Africa, where it is directly fighting Islamic State in multiple conflict arenas. ISKP also is critical of the Kremlin’s close ties with Iran and China.
It was the March 22 assault against Moscow’s Crocus City Hall, which killed at least 143 people and wounded approximately 80 others, that hyper-charged support for Islamic State among a segment of anti-Russia elements. ISKP has continued prioritizing Russia in its militant activities, as indicated by a planned follow-up attack against a busy shopping mall in Russia, which was reportedly disrupted with shared intelligence from Turkey.
Riding the momentum of the Moscow attack, ISKP published posters on messaging apps and social media sites in Russian, Tajik, Uzbek, and other languages issuing a “threat to all brutal Russians, including Putin,” promising they “will be massacred all together with your women and children” as revenge for the torture of prisoners. In the April issue of its flagship Voice of Khurasan magazine, titled “The Bear Bewildered,” ISKP boasted about the operation’s success, praised past attacks in Russia and the West, and directed supporters to commit further acts of violence.
More recently, the Russian branch of Al-Azaim has been focusing on the IK-19 prison break attempt near Volgograd, an incident officially claimed organized by IS Central. Russian-language content, including graphic footage of the attack, circulated on pro-ISKP channels claiming that attackers acted in retaliation for the global persecution and mistreatment of Muslims in Russia and worldwide.
Jihadism expert Riccardo Valle noted how “Al-AzaimRussia has intermittently praised or eulogized militants from the Caucasus region, such as Abdul Karim al-Ingushi, a militant killed in March 2024 in the Karabulak area.”
ISKP continues to operate active crowdfunding campaigns via dedicated propaganda channels, including magazines and encrypted messaging channels. In the wake of the Moscow attack, the Russian-language Voice of Khorasan, issue 2, published in June 2024, an ISKP poster solicited crypto donations in Monero (XMR), a popular privacy coin, in support for Jihad, while recent posts on RocketChat’s Al-Azaim Russia channel encouraged money transfers via TRC20 tokens. This is in line with recent evidence showing that IS-affiliated entities and their supporters have been moving away from popular cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin (subject to higher law-enforcement scrutiny), towards lesser-known, decentralized digital currencies, including on the TRON-Network.
Since 2018, several Islamist terrorist attacks and plots in France and elsewhere in Europe have been linked to young extremists from Russian North Caucasus republics, mostly Chechnya. In 2022, seven individuals from the North Caucasus were arrested for plotting an attack in Strasbourg, France, which was highly likely planned and directed from Afghanistan by ISKP operatives. In June 2023, a cell of three Chechen and Bosnian nationals were arrested in Austria for plotting to attack an LGBTQ parade in Vienna. The individuals raised money in online chat groups to buy weapons for ISKP, and one suspect intended to travel to Afghanistan to fight.
In May, the French DGSI arrested a young Chechen national suspected of plotting an Islamist terror attack during the Paris Olympics. The individual was reportedly in contact with known ISKP members through encrypted messaging apps. More recently, three ISKP-linked Chechen men were arrested in Belgium for plotting a terrorist attack.
Despite successful governmental efforts to disrupt its communication and dissemination networks, ISKP propagandists will almost certainly continue to exploit Telegram to promote its terrorist agenda, as well as fundraising and recruitment efforts. But given the enhanced scrutiny of Telegram of late, threat actors are also migrating to other, lower-profile channels to continue operations.
